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Abstract: This chapter investigates actions for annulment. Annulment actions constitute a central 
yet by-and-large neglected device of judicial review in the European Union. We focus on cases in 
which member states take the European Commission to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in order to fend off interferences with domestic policy application. Specifically, we ask 
when and why member states initiate such actions for annulment. To assess the validity of 
different answers to this question, we use data on the frequency of annulment litigation and 
evaluate the impact of four potential explanatory factors: the creative agency of the supervising 
Commission, the inept application of EU law by a shirking agent government, the heterogeneity 
of preferences held by the collective principal (i.e., the Council), and the interruption of the 
relationship between the commission and member state governments.  
  
Zusammenfassung: Gegenstand der Analyse in diesem Kapitel sind Nichtigkeitsklagen vor dem 
Europäischen Gerichtshof. Nichtigkeitsklagen sind eine zentrale, aber bisher weitgehend 
unerforschte Kategorie der Normenkontrolle im EU System. Wir untersuchen solche Klagefälle, in 
denen Mitgliedstaaten, um Eingriffe in nationale Politikgestaltung abzuwehren, die Europäische 
Kommission vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof verklagen. Wann und warum entscheiden sich 
nationale Regierungen für eine solche Nichtigkeitsklage? Um diese Frage zu beantworten werden 
vier potentielle Erklärungsfaktoren mit Hilfe von quantitativen Daten zur Häufigkeit der 
Klageerhebung in der EU-15 getestet: kreatives Handeln der Kommission als Agentin, 
unangemessene Anwendung durch eine pflichtverletzende nationale Regierung, heterogene 
Präferenzen im Rat als kollektivem Prinzipal und die Unterbrechung der Beziehung zwischen 
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Kommission und mitgliedstaatlicher Regierung, z.B. durch Wahlen oder die Benennung eines 
neuen Kommissars. noindent 
 
1. Introduction 
When the Court of Justice was founded as part of the European Coal and Steel Community, one 
key rationale behind its creation was the establishment of a mechanism through which the High 
Authority—as precursor to the European Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Commission”)—could be kept in check (Alter 1998, 124). To do so, member states were granted 
the right to initiate actions for annulment and have the Court review the legality of actions of the 
High Authority. In fact, action for annulment (today defined through Article 263 TFEU1) is still the 
central instrument for subjecting supranational legal acts to judicial review. Member states can 
ask the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)2 to review the legality of legal acts adopted 
by the Commission. Actions for annulment are thus a key instrument with which member states 
of the European Union control the actions of the Commission in its double function as their agent 
and as the guardian of the treaties. Yet in stark contrast to other legal instruments, such as 
preliminary reference and infringement proceedings, actions for annulment have remained—
with only few notable exceptions3—largely neglected by political science scholarship.4 
                                                   
1 TFEU stands for the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
2 The Court of Justice of the European Union consists of two major courts: the General Court and the Court of Justice, 
also known informally as the European Court of Justice. It is the latter to which we refer as CJEU and as “the Court” 
in this paper. 
3 See Adam, Bauer and Hartlapp 2015, Adam 2016; Bauer and Hartlapp 2010; Hartlapp and Bauer 2011; Jupille 2004; 
or McCown 2003. 
4 The three main channels through which the CJEU may deliver a judgment in legal disputes within the EU are 
infringement proceedings, preliminary rulings, and annulment proceedings. The infringement procedure, set out in 
Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), allows the Commission and the CJEU to 
deal with member states’ infringements of EU law. Most of the time it is used when a member state has not 
transposed an EU directive correctly or on time, or is applying single-market rules incorrectly. The key function of 
preliminary rulings is to ensure a harmonized application of EU law by national courts. Article 267 of the TFEU enables 
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This chapter addresses this research gap and analyzes when and why national governments make 
use of this “defense” instrument and initiate actions for annulment against the European 
Commission. To do so, data on the frequency of annulment litigation are analyzed.  
The chapter contributes to three strands of literature. First, it contributes to research on 
compliance in the EU, which generally distinguishes between correct policy transposition and 
correct policy application. The empirical perspective of this line of research is heavily biased 
toward the analysis of conflict over transposition delay (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; Toshkov 
2008; Thomson 2010; König and Luetgert 2008).5 By capturing instances of judicialized conflict 
over policy application between the Commission and the member states, a focus on actions for 
annulment promises to complement this biased perspective.  
Second, our focus contributes to the vast literature on the relationship between EU member 
states and the CJEU. This literature also suffers from a biased perspective: while it is well 
recognized that litigation has become increasingly important as an instrument in European 
politics (Kelemen 2006; Kelemen 2011), the strategic and political use of litigation is mainly 
attributed to private actors. National governments—again with some notable exceptions like 
Granger (2004) or Stone Sweet and Stranz (2012)—are still predominantly perceived as relatively 
passive and defensive actors before the CJEU. They are not expected to have much to gain when 
                                                   
national courts to refer to the CJEU questions of EU law regarding the interpretation of the treaty and the validity 
and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the EU. National courts may activate this 
procedure when they need the CJEU’s interpretations before delivering their judgments. Preliminary rulings have 
played a significant role in the development of community law, since it is through these exchanges between national 
courts and the CJEU that crucial concepts such as the direct effect and the supremacy of EU law have been developed. 
As we explain in this chapter, annulment action is the main channel allowing for review of the legality of EU legal 
acts—mainly by those affected by a certain supranational act or decision. Judicial review is an important mechanism 
in all systems subjected to the rule of law. Judicial review allows courts to review the acts of the legislative or the 
actions of the executive. It is thus an important component of the checks and balances in a system of separation of 
powers. While infringement proceedings are essentially a tool in the hands of the Commission and preliminary 
reference proceedings are largely a tool in the hands of national judges, annulment litigation is a legal channel open 
to different types of actors. 
5 But see Falkner et al. 2005; Hartlapp and Falkner 2009. 
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forced into the EU’s judicial arena by domestic courts initiating preliminary reference proceedings 
or by the Commission referring infringement proceedings to the CJEU (Alter 1998; Burley and 
Mattli 1993; Cichowski 1998, 2004; Stone Sweet and Brunell 2012; Weiler 1991; Mbaye 2001). In 
both of these kinds of proceedings, member states appear to be rather inactive, since it is not up 
to them to activate the CJEU. This chapter complements this perspective by studying instances in 
which national governments do indeed actively decide to turn to the CJEU.  
Third, the analysis contributes to more recent advances in research on actions for annulments 
more specifically. This emerging literature has helped to highlight the quite complex politics 
underlying the initiation of annulments. Sometimes, actions for annulment can serve strategic or 
symbolic purposes within strictly domestic policy conflicts (Adam 2015). Yet, quarrels about the 
distribution of competences within the EU’s multilevel structure is another important motivation 
to launch annulment litigation (Bauer and Hartlapp 2010; Hartlapp and Bauer 2011). 
Furthermore, member states have used actions for annulment with a clear hope to trigger judicial 
law making to shape policy regimes. With an increasingly powerful Commission and an increasing 
number of member states, shifting from the political to the judicial arena has become increasingly 
attractive to provoke policy change in a system encountering gridlock (Adam 2016). This chapter 
contributes to this strand of literature by exploring the relevance of four additional mechanisms 
underlying governmental annulment decisions: creative agency by the Commission, the aptness 
of member state implementation, increasing heterogeneity in the Council, and the interruption 
of cooperative relationships between member state governments and the Commission. 
The analysis indicates that while governments’ political power in the Council and their ineptness 
in applying EU law are important influences on litigation decisions, governments also tend to rely 
on annulment litigation more frequently when informal relationships with the Commission are 
interrupted as a result of the appointment of a new Commission or the election of a new 
government. 
The chapter begins with an introduction to the legal instrument of annulment litigation along with 
empirical patterns. We then develop theoretical arguments potentially able to account for these 
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patterns. Next, we present the data and method used to assess the validity of theoretical 
arguments. Finally, we present statistical results and conclude with a short synthesis of findings 
and implications. 
2. Annulment Litigation and Conflict over Policy Application  
Action for annulment is the central instrument of judicial review regarding supranational legal 
acts in the EU. The EU institutions, member states, and (to a lesser degree) private actors can use 
this instrument to activate the CJEU and have it review the legality of actions taken by EU 
institutions. Upon its activation, the CJEU evaluates the legality of the contested legal act and is 
able to declare the act void “on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their 
application, or misuse of powers” (Article 263 TFEU). Actions for annulment initiated by national 
governments against the Commission thus indicate a substantial or political conflict over 
questions of policy application as they typically occur in late stages of the policy cycle (Bauer and 
Hartlapp 2010; Hartlapp and Bauer 2011).6 
Policy implementation in the EU is a multi-phase process that can be divided into the 
transposition phase, during which supranational rules are translated into national legislation, and 
the application phase, during which the legal standards are actually put into practice. In most 
areas, the EU does not possess decentralized administrative structures to autonomously conduct 
policy application. Instead, it has to rely on the executives of the member states to translate EU 
law into national practice. This does not mean, however, that member states may apply EU law 
as they deem it appropriate. Instead, the Commission is equipped with extensive competencies 
                                                   
6 We are currently researching annulment actions in the frame of a broader project in which we complement the 
statistical analysis with in-depth case studies. The case studies indicate that the underlying motivations for 
governments to raise annulments are sometimes complex, see Adam, Bauer, Hartlapp and Mathieu (forthcoming). 
Sometimes, winning such a case is not the main target of the actors, as Adam, Bauer and Hartlapp (2015) have shown. 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of annulment actions are raised by member states against the Commission, 




to create and enforce rules to guide and harmonize national policy application and to enforce 
correct policy application. Specifically, via Commission directives and regulations, it can specify 
existing primary or secondary legislation and is responsible for the financial management of the 
EU’s spending programs (e.g., agriculture and structural policies) and even has direct adjudicating 
powers (most prominently within competition policy). If a member state is dissatisfied with 
Commission decisions, it can file an action of annulment as an instrument of judicial review in any 
of these areas. In other words, wherever the Commission directly regulates or intervenes in 
member states’ application practices—by sanctioning existing malpractice, rejecting new 
application schemes, or providing guidelines for future application practices—member states can 
initiate actions for annulment against the respective legal act.  
The substance of these complaints varies greatly. Germany, for example, challenged as illegal a 
Commission decision declaring state aid to a Bavarian steel producer (case C-399/95), the UK 
opposed the Commission’s conduct of EU measures to combat social exclusion (case C-106/96), 
Italy sought to extend a preferential tariff for the supply of electricity (case T-53/08), and Denmark 
fought the Commission for its right to use “feta” as a label for cheese (case C-466/02). In all of 
these cases, national governments used annulment litigation to seek the correction of 
Commission actions that directly interfered with the way these governments applied EU policies. 
Figure 1: Annulment Actions Initiated by National Governments between 1996 and 2007. 
../Bilder/Abb1_05.png 
N = 307. Source: own data 
Yet, not only does the substance of annulment litigation vary greatly; the frequency with which 
member states need or want to make use of this instrument of judicial review does as well. Figure 
1 illustrates the number of annulment actions initiated by national governments between 1996 
and 2007. We focus on this time period to include as many member states as possible and at the 
same time to ensure a balanced panel. 
On average, we observe for this period about 25 actions for annulment by national governments 
belonging to the group of EU-15 states against the Commission every year. Yet, member states 
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scatter substantially around this average number. Italy initiated 80 annulment actions while 
Portugal initiated only a single action against the Commission. The United Kingdom accused the 
Commission of illegal actions in 12 cases. Germany and Greece each did so in 32 instances. Is this 
variation random or systematic? Which factors might systematically affect how important or 
attractive annulment litigation is to national governments?  
3. Analytical Frame 
To capture the essence of post-decisional dynamics in the EU—to which the annulment problem 
can be subsumed—it is helpful to use the perspective of a principal-agent model as a starting 
point. This model needs to be extended by the consideration that member state governments 
actually do play a double role in the context of applying EU law (Tallberg 2000). On the one hand, 
every member state government is itself a constitutive part of a collective principal—at the 
supranational level. This principal consists of all member governments as represented in the 
Council and plays a crucial role in the adoption of EU legislation and the definition of EU law. On 
the other hand, given that the EU has no means or structures to itself implement any decision, 
the absence of EU administrative structures at the decentral (i.e., the member-state level) turns 
individual member states into implementation agents that are supposed to faithfully transpose EU 
legislation and apply EU law at the national level. The EU Commission represents the centerpiece 
in this principal-agent constellation. As guardian of the treaties, the collective principal has 
equipped the Commission with certain powers to supervise domestic policy application and 
compliance. The collective principal delegates competences to the Commission because it has an 
interest in making sure that EU law is applied appropriately. At the same time, the collective 
principal defines restrictions to the Commission’s competences, because it wants to protect 
certain areas of individual state sovereignty (“contract specification”).  
There are several different formal and informal instruments of control installed to avoid 
shirking—or agency loss—at any stage of policy application (Pollack 2003, 89-90). Actions for 
annulment are one such control instrument. The question, then, is, when should we actually 




Since annulment litigation by national governments against the Commission are manifestations 
of conflict over policy application, Hartlapp and Bauer (2011) propose that the probability of 
occurrence of such annulment conflict is determined by the creativity with which the Commission 
interprets its delegated powers (“agency loss”) and the costs that governments would suffer 
when refraining from such annulment litigation. Refraining from annulment litigation is 
particularly costly when annulment actions could be directed at sanctions adopted by the 
Commission for domestic misapplication of EU law.  
Whether or not creative agency by the Commission will attract annulment actions, conflict may 
depend on how aggressively the Commission is testing the borders of its mandate and on whether 
the purpose of this creative agency is actually in line with policy preferences of all member states. 
Since perceptions of trustworthiness are shown to affect behavior in principal-agent relationships 
(Whitford and Ochs 2014), we also assess the impact of interruptions in the relationship between 
the Commission and the member states.  
Anchored in theoretical reasoning of the principal-agent approach, this chapter assesses to what 
degree four factors systematically influence the probability and frequency of annulment 
litigation: the creative agency of the supervising Commission, the inept application of EU law by 
a shirking agent government, the heterogeneity of preferences held by the Council as collective 
entity, and the interruption of the relationship between the Commission and the member states.  
3.1 Creative Agency by the Commission 
A first potential determinant of the frequency of annulment litigation is the degree of creativity 
with which the Commission interprets its mandate. In our context, the term creative agency refers 
to the interference with domestic policy application by the Commission through which it crosses 
the borders of its delegated powers. This factor directly relates to the original rationale for 
including annulment actions in the treaties. Member states should have the ability to fend off 
unwanted interferences by the Commission that are perceived to be illegal within ordered judicial 
proceedings. Annulment actions can only be successful when the CJEU can be convinced by the 
applicant government that the contested action by the Commission was adopted despite a lack 
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of competence, infringed essential procedural requirements, infringed the treaties or any rule of 
law relating to their application, or was the result of a misuse of power by the Commission (Article 
263 TFEU). Annulment litigation thus allows (and requires) governments to accuse the 
Commission of breaching its mandate and crossing the borders of its delegated powers.  
To see how creative agency can trigger annulment litigation, consider the following example in 
which several member states accused the Commission of breaching its mandate in the context of 
the EU’s public procurement regime that was introduced by the directives 2004/17/EC (focusing 
on procurement of public utilities) and 2004/18/EC (focusing on general public procurement). 
These directives define financial thresholds, separating those public contracts for which European 
rules apply and those for which they do not.7 The Commission is in charge of making sure that 
member state authorities comply with these provisions. Yet, even though the two directives 
explicitly defined where the impact of EU law should end (i.e., below the financial thresholds), the 
Commission argued that according to CJEU case law, this border was not as definitive as the 
member states might have wanted. Specifically, in its interpretation of its mandate, the 
Commission held that all public contracts (also those explicitly excluded by the directives!) needed 
sufficient ex-ante transparency in the form of widespread advertisement, as well as transparent 
and non-discriminatory awarding procedures, as long as the contracts at stake were relevant to 
the internal market. Deviations from this practice could be accepted only where the member 
states could prove the specific contract to be of no relevance to the internal market. Since a series 
of member states viewed this interference with domestic application of EU public procurement 
provisions as an act of creative agency through which the Commission extended its powers 
beyond the borders defined within these directives, they initiated an annulment action (case T-
258/06).  
                                                   
7 Specifically, supply and service contracts of less than 499,000 EUR and public works contracts of less than 6,242,000 
EUR should not be subject to the rules defined by these directives, leaving more leeway for public entities when 
awarding small contracts. 
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This example underlines how varying frequencies of annulment litigation by national 
governments could be determined by the way in which the Commission interprets its mandate. 
This interpretation might affect member states differently. We expect frequent initiations of 
annulment litigation in case the Commission generally interprets its mandate aggressively. 
Whenever the Commission interprets its mandate prudently, we expect few annulment actions 
to be necessary. 
There are essentially two aspects to the degree of “aggressiveness” with which the Commission 
interferes with member states’ policy application: how frequently the Commission interferes and 
how far reaching each intervention is. The qualitative aspect of the intensity of interference, 
capturing whether the Commission has remained within or reached beyond the boundaries of its 
mandate, is very difficult to assess, particularly for a large number of cases. In fact, it takes the 
CJEU itself several years to decide these matters. Yet, due to problems of selection bias, these 
assessments by the CJEU cannot serve us as measures of the intensity of Commission 
interference, potentially explaining the frequency of litigation without creating problems of 
endogeneity. In consequence, in this chapter we restrict our focus to the frequency of 
interference.  
Against this background, we assess in hypothesis 1 whether the frequency of annulment litigation 
is a function of the frequency with which the commission interferes with domestic policy 
application: 
H1: The more frequently the Commission interferes with domestic policy application, the more 
frequently member states will initiate annulment litigation. 
3.2 Inept Application by Agent Governments 
Although any action for annulment is necessarily framed as an accusation of an illegal interference 
with domestic policy application by the Commission, this legal framing might just be a strategy to 
cover up domestic problems with the application of EU policies. Most actions for annulment 
emerge in the contexts of the EU’s agricultural policy, competition policy, and regional policy 
(Bauer and Hartlapp 2010). In these areas, the Commission has the power to assess domestic 
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policy application through legally binding enforcement decisions that can comprise financial 
sanctions, particularly where policy application concerns the spending of EU funds. It does not 
have to rely on the adoption of reasoned opinions to assess the legality of domestic policy 
application where the binding legal assessment is left to the CJEU. Since the Commission can 
define legally binding sanction, inept or faulty policy application in these sectors can thus be 
particularly costly for member states. With the initiation of an action for annulment, national 
governments can have the CJEU review the legality of such costly decisions. They thereby 
maintain a chance of evading sanctions and required changes to domestic arrangements of policy 
application defined within these decisions. A potential source of actions for annulment might thus 
be inept policy application by national governments.  
Two brief examples from the German context can help illustrate how inept application of EU law 
can give rise to annulment litigation. In this case, the European Court of Auditors identified 
systemic errors in the way the spending of the European Regional Development Fund was 
managed and controlled in the German state of Thüringen. Apparently, companies were wrongly 
categorized as Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises or SME’s, and criteria for receiving additional 
funding were misapplied on several occasions. Indeed, the error rate was estimated to be over 
30%.  
The identification of these administrative errors led to the adoption of financial sanctions by the 
Commission against Germany. Since Germany was unwilling to accept these sanctions, it initiated 
an action for annulment against the respective Commission decision, hoping to evade these 
sanctions (case T-265/08). Similarly, in a case from the context of agricultural policy, the 
Commission refused to cover about 1.7 million DEM of the sum that German authorities had paid 
out to domestic producers of sheep meat in 1984. The Commission complained about the lack of 
an adequate system of administrative and onsite inspections and about the lack of evidence that 
certain administrative inspections and onsite inspections were carried out in a satisfactory 
manner. The competent authorities failed to draw up any written reports about the occurrence 
or results of such inspections. With the subsequent action for annulment, the German 
government tried to fend off the financial sanctions (case C-8/88). 
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While inept policy application occurs in all member states, it should be more typical in member 
states suffering from low administrative capacity and low quality in executive processes. In fact, 
the lack of executive capacity is regularly found to be one central source contributing to the EU’s 
implementation deficit (Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998; Knill and Peter 2006; Toshkov 2008). 
Similarly, we expect legal conflict over policy application to be more frequent in member states 
with low government effectiveness.  
H2: The lower a government’s effectiveness, the more frequently this government will initiate 
annulment litigation. 
3.3 Heterogeneous Preferences in the Council  
A third factor to consider is that member states accusing the Commission of illegal actions might 
not exclusively be motivated by the de jure legality of these activities. Instead, the formulation of 
such an accusation will crucially depend on whether the Commission’s activities coincide or 
collide with member states’ policy preferences. In other words, the underlying motivation for 
accusing the Commission of creative agency can be political whenever governments do not like 
the policy consequences of actions by the Commission. Whether the Commission is accused of 
illegal agency might thus not necessarily be determined by legal questions but by the political 
preferences of national governments (Adam et al. 2015). From this perspective, we expect no 
annulment litigation to be initiated when all governments welcome the policy implications of 
Commission actions.  
Yet, with an increasing level of heterogeneity of member states in the Council, it is less and less 
likely that all member governments share similar policy preferences over specific issues. In 
consequence, it will be more difficult for the Commission to coordinate uniform compromises 
over questions of policy application with all member states collectively. As the collective principal 
becomes more heterogeneous, the probability increases that any action by the Commission will 
receive criticism by some member states. This expectation that a greater degree of heterogeneity 
or fragmentation in the Council and the resulting greater difficulty to coordinate agreements will 
enhance the importance of litigation as political tool equally corresponds to Kelemen’s 
explanation for the spread of “Eurolegalism” (Kelemen 2006; 2011).  
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The relevance of this argument can be underlined with an example from the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). One important element of the EU’s CAP is the subsidization of farmers 
through the intervention in markets for agricultural products. When market prices fall below a 
certain guaranteed price, the EU steps in by buying up products at this guaranteed price and 
storing them in so-called “intervention stocks.” In the past, this led to the overproduction of 
agricultural products in intervention stocks (“butter mountains”). Until this situation of 
overflowing intervention stocks was back under control, the member states in the Council agreed 
to distribute products from intervention stocks among the most deprived EU citizens.8 The 
specific rules guiding the distribution are defined in an annual plan adopted as Commission 
regulation. Distributed food should come from intervention stocks. Additional food purchases for 
distribution are only allowed in exceptional circumstances (e.g., where certain products are 
temporarily unavailable in intervention stocks during the implementation of the annual 
distribution plan).  
Conflict emerged in 2008. In response to increasing demand for dairy products, market prices 
soared, and no products were sold into intervention stocks, leaving no food for distribution 
among deprived people. To maintain the aid program, the Commission authorized the 
supplementary purchase of food on the markets.9 The German government decried this measure 
as being out of touch with the CAP and to be essentially a measure of social policy. In the eyes of 
the German government, the Commission had thus clearly misused its powers in this regard. In 
response, Germany initiated an action for annulment against the Commission regulation. 
Germany was supported by the Swedish government, but not all member states opposed the 
Commission’s willingness to maintain food distribution among deprived people during times of 
low intervention stocks. Specifically, Italy, France, Spain, and Poland welcomed the Commission’s 
interpretation of its mandate in this context and joined the action for annulment as interveners 
                                                   
8 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3730/87 of 10 December 1987. 
9 Commission Regulation (EC) No 983/2008 of 3 October 2008 (OJ 2008 L 268, p. 3. 
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in support of the Commission’s trying to get the CJEU to dismiss the German action as 
inadmissible (case T-576/08). Clearly, this conflict resulted from the economic heterogeneity of 
the member states. Germany in particular opposed paying for food (through community budgets) 
serving other member states as social policy programs. Economic heterogeneity made it 
impossible for the Commission to accommodate the interests of all member states and resulted 
in the litigation by opponents.  
The heterogeneity of policy preferences of the collective principal thus influences the probability 
with which we can expect annulment litigation. Specifically, we expect that the probability that 
Commission actions will be welcomed by all member states and will thus not be subjected to 
litigation by any one particular member government decreases with the heterogeneity of policy 
preferences in the Council. 
H3: The more heterogeneous the policy preferences in the Council, the more frequently governments 
will initiate annulment litigation.  
To assess this hypothesis, we rely on two measures. First, we assess the impact of member states’ 
economic heterogeneity. Second, Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 increased the 
heterogeneity of the collective principal. Not only did the absolute number of constituent 
members of the collective principal increase from 15 to 25, heterogeneity also increased in 
cultural, social, and economic terms (Zielonka 2006). We thus expect that any one of the original 
EU-15 member states should have a greater probability of engaging in annulment litigation after 
enlargement than before enlargement.  
3.4 Interrupted Relationship 
The fourth hypothesis we analyze is concerned with the relevance of trust in principal-agent 
relationships, highlighted by experimental research on cooperation (Miller and Whitford 2002). 
This line of research provides at least two major insights: (a) empirically, principals tend to trust 
agents and are consequently more generous in terms of contract design than standard accounts 
of principal-agent theory would suggest (Fehr and Falk 1999; Berg et al. 1995); and (b) the 
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perception of trustworthiness affects behavior in principal-agent relationships (Whitford and 
Ochs 2014). 
In a similar way, the interaction between the Commission and member state governments might 
be affected by perceptions of trustworthiness.  
Actions for annulment are highly formal and legalistic instruments of control. Their use is 
generally the exception rather than the norm. In fact, we know that member states and the 
Commission often do not rely on such formalistic interaction. Instead, national executives and the 
Commission often coordinate policy application practices through informal exchange and 
communication. In the context of state aid policy, for example, national executives often consult 
the Commission before adopting domestic state aid measures in order to avoid negative 
Commission decisions in the first place.  
The question, however, is how sure can the Commission be that a specific national government 
can be trusted to stick to informal agreements and apply EU law appropriately? And how sure can 
any national government be that the Commission can be trusted to honor its informal 
commitments and interpret its role accordingly? A newly appointed Commission dealing with all 
member states for the first time might answer these questions differently than a Commission that 
has been long established. National governments dealing with this newly appointed Commission 
might not be sure whether the new Commission will stick to the informal agreements established 
with the outgoing Commission. Similarly, an established Commission dealing with a newly elected 
government might be less certain about whether this new government is more or less trustworthy 
than the old one. Finally, a newly elected national government interacting with the Commission 
for the first time might be less sure about the trustworthiness of the Commission than a 
government that holds long and stable relationships with the Commission.  
Against this background, it seems plausible to suspect that interruptions in the relationship 
between the Commission and the member states will reduce the level of trust within this system. 
Either side can simply not be sure yet whether soft (i.e., informal) agreements will be honored 
after a change in top-level personnel takes place. In consequence, both sides have an incentive 
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to revert to formal means of interaction, whereby the discretion of either side is minimized and 
its legal accountability maximized. Consequently, we expect the importance of formal control 
mechanisms—such as annulment litigation—to increase in years in which relations are 
interrupted as a result of the appointment of a new Commission or the election of a new 
government.  
H4: When informal relationships between national executives and the Commission are interrupted 
(through the appointment of a new Commission or the election of a new government), the interaction 
between governments and the Commission becomes more formal and legalistic and the occurrence 
of actions for annulment more frequent.  
It will take time for informal relationships to be re-established with the new staff. Until then, the 
Commission will take a more legalistic approach when interfering with domestic policy 
application. Similarly, national governments will feel a greater need to control Commission 
behavior through legalistic means. Consequently, the interruption of the relationship on either 
side will enhance the conflict potential held by Commission acts as well as member states’ 
predisposition toward answering these acts in the form of litigation. We test this argument by 
including a dummy variable that identifies whether the relationship with a certain member state 
is interrupted due to the appointment of a new Commission or through the election of a new 
government in this member state.  
4. Data and Methods 
To assess the validity of these theoretical arguments, we use data on the frequency of actions for 
annulment by national governments against the Commission. Observations in the dataset 
represent country-years. For data on the dependent variable, we rely on our own coding efforts 
on the basis of the EUR-Lex and Curia databases as well as on data provided by Stone Sweet and 
Brunell (2006). Specifically, we cross-checked, and refined a dataset provided by Stone Sweet and 
Brunell on annulment litigation to be able to differentiate a government applying for an action 
for annulment from governments that merely joined the dispute as interveners. Finally, we added 
annulment litigation initiated in 2007.  
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To operationalize the frequency with which the Commission interferes with domestic policy 
application, we rely on original data on the number of Commission decisions addressed to each 
of the EU-15 member states each year. This information was collected with the help of the EUR-
Lex database. The Commission interferes with domestic policy application through Commission 
decisions, commission regulations, and commission directives. Yet, since regulations and 
directives affect all member states alike, the member-state-specific frequency can be captured 
through the number of Commission decisions addressed to each member state. The number of 
regulations and directives can be thought of as a rate of interference that is constant for each 
year across all member states. We thus focus on Commission decisions.  
In the following paragraphs, we describe the conceptualization of the independent variables; the 
degree of government effectiveness is captured by the World Bank’s governance indicators 
(Kaufman et al. 2007). To test the argument that the frequency of annulment litigation increases 
in the heterogeneity of member states in the Council, we include a dummy variable for Eastern 
enlargement. This variable takes the value of 1 for the years 2004–2007 and the value of 0 before 
that time. This should capture the general increase in member-state heterogeneity after 
enlargement. Although this should have affected all the EU-15 states alike, we also capture both 
the economic heterogeneity and the heterogeneity in terms of EU skepticism within this group. 
To capture the degree of economic heterogeneity, we assess the degree of variation in member 
states’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Specifically, we assess how the frequency of litigation 
corresponds with the standard deviation of member states’ GDP in any given year.  
To identify years in which the relationship between the Commission and national governments is 
interrupted, we include a dummy variable. This variable takes the value of 1 for all member states 
for the years 1999 and 2004. In 1999, the Santer Commission was replaced by the Prodi 
Commission. This change included the change of two of the three Commissioners responsible for 
the policy sectors that are most relevant for actions for annulment: competition and regional 
policy. Only Franz Fischler—Commissioner for agricultural policy—remained in office under 
President Santer and President Prodi. In 2004, the Prodi Commission was replaced by the Barroso 
Commission after only one term. This time, all three Commissioners responsible for sectors most 
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relevant for annulment litigation were replaced. Furthermore, the variable takes the value of 1 
for individual member states whenever a new national government was elected in this member 
state. For this information on national elections, we again rely on data included in the ParlGov-
Database (Döring and Manow 2012).  
In addition to these independent variables, we add several control variables to the analysis. First, 
we control for national legal cultures. This attempt reflects the intuition that governments’ 
different propensities to make use of judicial review at the supranational level might be 
influenced by the role judicial review plays at the national level. While some member states have 
a strong culture of judicial review in which the constitutionality of national legislation can and is 
regularly assessed, others do not. In controlling for this aspect, we include the national strength 
of judicial review as provided by Lijphart (1999). Furthermore, we added voting power in the 
Council as control for state power, because state power is regularly found to affect the way 
member states and the Commission interact over questions of compliance (Börzel et al. 2011; 
Börzel et al. 2010). Finally, we include a country-dummy for Italy. As figure 1 has shown above, 
Italy stands out as the most active litigant. To rule out results being driven by the characteristics 
of Italy, we include this control. Table 1 summarizes the details for each of these variables.  
Table 1: Variables Used for Analysis. 
 n mean std. dev. min max 
Dependent variable      
Number of annulment actions 180 1.71 2.35 0 16 
Independent variables      
Number of decisions 180 37.71 30.45 1 133 
Government effectiveness 180 1.65 0.43 0.33 2.24 
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Enlargement 180   0 1 
Economic heterogeneity 180 0.69 0.04 0.62 0.77 
Heterogeneity of EU 
skepticism 
180 
0.48 0.04 0.40 0.55 
Change in government or 
Commission 
180 
  0 1 
Control variables      
Strength of judicial review 180 2.13 0.89 1 4 
State power 180 6.10 3.40 1.19 11.67klein 
 
To include as many member states as possible and at the same time to maintain a balanced panel, 
we start the period analyzed in 1996 and focus on the group of EU-15 states throughout. Due to 
data restrictions, we focus the analysis on the time period between 1996 and 2007.  
Since our dependent variable takes the form of over-dispersed count data, we use a negative 
binomial regression model (Cameron and Trivedi 2001; Winkelmann 2008). In addition to the 
variables introduced above, we present model specifications that include two additional control 
variables. Since Italy stands out as the most frequent litigant, we include a dummy variable for 
Italy to make sure that this country does not solely drive results. Furthermore, the hypothesis of 
no serial correlation can only be rejected when we include a lagged dependent variable. Although 
ignoring serial correlation can bias results just as the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable can 
(Achen 2001), we interpret results with and without the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable. Finally, we include robust standard errors for the 15 member-state clusters.  
5. Empirical Evidence 
20 
 
Based on our regression results, we cannot confirm the first hypothesis; with our approach, we 
find no support for the argument that an aggressive interpretation of its mandate by the 
Commission enhances member states’ actions for annulment (creative agency). Because of the 
difficulty involved in assessing the quality of Commission interferences with domestic policy 
application, we reverted to assessing the frequency with which the Commission interferes 
domestically. Here, there is no evidence of a relationship between frequent interference and 
frequent annulment litigation. This indicates that the frequent initiation of actions for annulment 
is not a quasi-automatic reaction to frequent interferences by the Commission. After all, we find 
no relationship between the frequency of interferences by the Commission and the frequency of 
annulment litigation. However, although the quality of these interferences might very well 
influence the probability of initiating individual actions for annulment, capturing this quality in 
comparative terms is rather difficult.  
The assessment of a potential effect of enhanced heterogeneity of preferences in the Council 
yields ambiguous results. We tested this argument by assessing whether the frequency of 
annulment litigation increased significantly after Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 
(hypothesis 3). Based on regression models (1) and (3), this hypothesis has to be rejected based 
on conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance. Yet, if we exclude the lagged 
dependent variable but include a dummy variable for Italy as in regression model (2), the 
frequency of annulment litigation seems indeed to be significantly greater than zero for the years 
after Eastern enlargement. Similar results are obtained when assessing the impact of member 
states’ economic heterogeneity. Here, models (4) and (5) suggest a positive relationship between 
economic heterogeneity and the frequency of litigation. Yet, when we include the lagged 
dependent variable in model (6) to account for serially correlated error terms, this relationship is 
lost. 
In contrast to these ambiguous results, we find rather strong support for a negative relationship 
between government effectiveness and the frequency of litigation. Specifically, the results show 
that governments that typically suffer from inept policy application as a result of low levels of 
government effectiveness do indeed litigate more frequently than governments that enjoy the 
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benefits of a highly efficient executive apparatus. On the one hand, less-effective governments 
have an interest to minimize EU requirements for domestic-policy application. They can use 
annulment actions to try to fend off such requirements formulated by the Commission. On the 
other hand, annulment litigation can come in handy when the Commission accuses governments 
of inept policy application. This is relevant more frequently for less-effective governments than 
for very effective governments.  
Furthermore, the analysis supports the argument that annulment litigation as an instrument of 
conflict resolution becomes more important in years in which informal relationships between 
member states and the Commission are interrupted. This finding supports the argument that 
when a new Commission is appointed or a new government is elected, the change in high-level 
personnel makes it harder for either party to rely on informal agreements. Instead, interaction 
becomes formalistic and legalistic. In consequence, we observe a higher rate of annulment 
litigation. Finally, we observe that a national culture of strong judicial review does not affect how 
governments make use of judicial review at the supranational level. Yet, the willingness to initiate 
annulment litigation increases with state power. Even though Italy stands out as the most 
frequent litigant, the insignificant coefficient for the respective country-dummy suggests that 
Italian observations are accounted for by the regressors explicitly included in the model. There is 
no need to control for additional unobserved factors.  
Table 2: Regression Results. 
Modelklein (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















H2: Inept Application      
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Modelklein (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged DV  
 0.10*** 
(0.04) 





























Log likelihood –275.42 –275.26 –269.49 –275.70 –275.59 –269.60 
Observations 180 180 179 180 180 179klein 
Note: The table presents results of a pooled negative binomial regression. Coefficients are 
unstandardized coefficients. Robust standard errors for 15 country clusters are in brackets. *** p < 
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Figure 2: Illustrating the Estimated Effects of Explanatory Variables. 
../Bilder/Abb2_05.png 
Note: Effects calculated on the basis of the estimates delivered by model 6. All variables except 
those explicitly manipulated in the figure are kept at their respective means. Vertical lines indicate 
95% confidence intervals.  
Figure 2 illustrates the effects found to be statistically significant. Governments with the highest level 
of government effectiveness in the sample are between about 45% (in years without change in 
Commission or government) and about 20% (in years with a change in Commission or government) 
more likely to abstain completely from annulment litigation (initiate zero actions) than governments 
with the lowest level of government effectiveness. Similarly, figure 2 shows the effects of states’ 
degree of voting power in the Council. When keeping all other variables at their respective arithmetic 
means, a maximal increase in states’ voting power in the Council reduces the predicted probability of 
initiating zero actions for annulment from about 53% to about 17% in years without a change in the 
Commission or the national government. The same increase in voting power reduces the predicted 




This chapter criticized pertinent scholarship on judicial politics and compliance in the EU for its 
neglect of actions for annulment. Since actions for annulment by national governments against 
the Commission reflect an important dimension of legal conflict over questions of policy 
application, and because annulment actions are one of the few ways in which national 
governments can directly address the CJEU, analyzing this instrument of judicial review has the 
potential to complement research in both these areas. Against this background, we asked why 
certain governments initiate more actions than others for annulment against the Commission, 
and we come to the following main findings.  
First, we find that there is no relationship between the frequency with which the Commission 
interferes with domestic policy application and the frequency with which governments charge 
that such interferences by the Commission are illegal. This indicates that the initiation of 
annulment litigation is not just an “automatic” reaction to the intensity of the Commission’s 
interferences and suggests that the initiation of litigation depends on the quality of the 
Commission’s interference. Our data thus do not support theoretical accounts that portray the 
Commission as purposefully entrepreneurial or intrusive with a view to national policy 
implementation.  
Second, we find that governments suffering from low levels of effectiveness are especially prone 
to turn to annulment litigation. While actions for annulment were created to make sure that the 
Commission would not misuse its powers, these results show that governments that tend to have 
problems with the appropriate application of EU law at the national level are the ones most likely 
to accuse the Commission of such misuses. This indicates that the accusation of illegal behavior 
by the Commission is often simply a cover-up for inept policy application by individual member 
state governments in the sense that “attack is the best form of defense”.  
Third, annulment litigation as a formal instrument of control becomes especially important when 
established informal relationships with the Commission are interrupted through the appointment 
of a new Commission or as a result of the election of a new national government. In these years, 
we observe an enhanced rate of occurrence of annulment litigation. Trust as the foundation for 
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informal agreements has to be built, no matter if a new Commission deals with an established 
government or an established Commission deals with a new government. Either way, we expect 
the Commission to be more formalistic and strict in its interference with domestic arrangements. 
As a consequence, we observe more frequent annulment litigation in years in which established 
relationships are interrupted. To further assess this argument, future research could analyze 
more closely to what degree interrupted relationships change the quality of Commission 
interferences with domestic policy application and how this increases room for “creative” agency. 
The enhanced frequency of annulment litigation leads us to believe that the quality becomes 
more formalistic and legalistic. Results are not robust for the impact of economic heterogeneity 
and of the increased heterogeneity due to Eastern enlargement. A closer qualitative look might 
provide additional insights as to whether and when this factor becomes important.  
In this chapter, we have focused on the determinants of annulment litigation while neglecting the 
effects of such litigation at the national and supranational level. The CJEU’s assessment of the 
legality of actions by the Commission relies on a review of internal Commission procedures—for 
example on whether the Commission has invested enough effort into providing sufficient reasons 
for adopting a certain decision—and an interpretation of the Commission’s mandate. CJEU rulings 
on annulment actions can thus affect internal procedures and the perception of the Commission’s 
mandate sustainably. One promising option for future research on annulment litigation thus 
consists of the investigation of effects of CJEU case law on the procedures of and power balance 
between EU institutions. Moreover, while this chapter focused on patterns of litigation at the 
aggregate level, certain questions emerge: What are the motivations for national governments to 
take the Commission to Court in concrete constellations? What are the actor constellations under 
which litigation becomes more likely? And what is the likely impact of annulment cases for policy 
making and domestic implementation? One crucial implication from the particular perspective of 
the chapters assembled in this monograph needs to be highlighted, namely that annulment 
litigation is a “reaction” to supranational decisions about how national authorities have to 
implement EU policies. On both ends—be it the Commission’s decision in the first place or the 
defensive reaction by the member states in the form of the annulment litigation—political 
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considerations are clearly discernable. Annulment litigation thus tells a story of political struggle 
about post-decisional policy making in the multilevel system. The EU Commission has become a 
crucial player in this field. 
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